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decision in the principal case clearly overrides this dictum.
The North Carolina Court has a traditionally favorable attitude
towards dower,18 but it is hard to find any logical reason for not applying the ten year limitation to the wife's dower in the equity of redemption. Should a case with similar facts come before the court again, the
matter should be examined anew.
ERNEST S. DELANEY, JR.
Municipal Corporations-' 'Necessary Expense" as Question of Law
or Fact-Determination of Local Necessity*
Until 1868 the General Assembly could authorize counties, cities and
towns to levy taxes and incur -debt without limit.i Local governmental
units had taken advantage of this freedom by investing heavily in the
internal improvements program, suffering heavy losses when the imThere was a prevalent feeling that
provement companies failed.1
-the General Assembly had allowed the public money to be foolishly
spent, and there arose a demand that restrictions be imposed upon this
unlimited power. One resulting limitation upon the power of the General Assembly and upon the imprudence of county and municipal officials
is found in Article VII, section 7, of the North Carolina Constitution,
'which provides that "[n]o county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any -debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor
shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except
for the necessary expenses thereof, unless approved by a majority of
those who shall vote thereon in any election held for such purpose."2
[Italics added.]
The exception of "necessary expenses" from the application of this
provision raised the question of who decides what are "necessary expenses," as well as the problem of which expenditures fall within the
meaning of the term.3 It was early established that the courts are to
where the husband has an equity that he could enforce if living. But in this case
he had none that he could enforce, .... And as the husband would have had no
equity the plaintiff has none ...

."

Rhea v. Rawls, 131 N. C. 453, 454, 42 S. E.

900 (1902).
'

18

"Dower is a favorite of the law . . . and the courts will not be astute to

find ways by which it will be barred." Rook v. Horton, 190 N. C. 180, 184, 129
S. E. 450, 452 (1925).
* This material was prepared during the summer of 1951 while the author was
serving as a member of the staff of the Institute of Government.
'See University R.R. v. Holden, 63. N. C. 410, 426, 431, 434 (1869).
.'See University R.R. v. Holden, 63 N. C. 410, 426, 432 (1869) ; Galloway v.
Chatham R.R., 63 N. C. 147, 153 (1869).
This section was amended by vote at the general election of November 2, 1948.
It formerly required a "vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein."
. ' See Coates and Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses," 18 N. C..L. Rav. 93 (1940),
for a thorough discussion of the classifications of expenditures, the tests and standards which have evolved from the cases deciding what are and what are not "neces-
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decide what are "necessary expenses" as a class, and the local governing
authorities are to decide whether those types of expenditures classed as
"necessary expenses" by the court are in fact necessary in a particular
time and place.4 This proposition has been reiterated and followed in
numerous decisions.5 It is supported by logic as well as by precedent, 6
sary expenses," and the relative functions of the courts and commissioners.
Another problem developed when the court suggested in several cases that it
would go further than merely to determine what classes of expenditures come
within the meaning of "necessary expenses," and would also differentiate among
localities to which the classifications would apply. See Coates and Mitchell,
"Necessary Expenses," 18 N. C. L. R . 93 at 113 (1940). But this question was
laid at rest in Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N. C. 1, 40 S. E. 2d 702 (1946), holding
that parks and playgrounds are not a necessary expense; there the court stated that
Atkins v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936), holding that parks and
playgrounds are a necessary expense for a populous industrial city like Durham,
would not be followed as precedent. The court said further: ". . . the Atkins case
proceeds on the theory that, by constitutional intent, the restriction [Art. VII, §7]
may apply to some municipalities and not to others, depending on population, industrial and other factors-a rule which if left to the governing bodies to apply,
invades the province of the courts, and if left to the courts, is difficult, if not
impossible, to apply. However such conditions may control the taxing authorities
in determining, within the scope of their power, when a need, recognized by the
Constitution as a necessary expense, arises in the particular jurisdiction, no such
distinction is inherent in the constitutional provision. What is a necessary expense
is a matter for the courts." Id. at 9, 40 S.E. 2d 702, 708 (1946).
' In the first case to consider the question, an injunction was sought against the
levy of a tax to build a bridge. It was alleged that the bridge was ill-placed, unnecessary, inconvenient, and extravagantly expensive. The court stated: "Who
is to decide what are the necessary expenses of a county? . . . 'Repairing and
building bridges is a part of the necessary expenses of a county .. .so the case
before us is within the power of the county commissioners. How can this court
undertake to control its exercise? Can we say, such a bridge does not need repairs; or that in building a new bridge near the site of an old bridge, it should
be erected as heretofore, upon posts, so as to be cheap, but warranted to last for
some years; or that it is better policy to locate it a mile or so above, where the
banks are good abuttments, and to have stone pillars, at a heavier outlay at the
start, but such as will ensure permanence, and be cheaper in the long run? ...
this court is not capable of controlling the exercise of power . ..and it cannot
assume to do so, without putting itself in antagonism as well to the General Assembly, as to the county authorities. . . . Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244, 249250 (1870). This decision was interpreted in Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748
(1876), to mean that the courts are to determine what class of expenditures fall
within the definition of "necessary expenses," and the commissioners are to decide
whether those types of expenditures so classed are in fact necessary in a particular
instance. This is the accepted rule of subsequent decisions.
' Green v. Kitchen, 229 N. C. 450, 50 S.E. 2d 545 (1948) ; Jefferson Standard
Life Insurance Co. v. Guilford County, 213 N. C. 293, 34 S.E. 2d 430 (1945);
Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603
(1938) ; Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1937) ; Palmer v. Haywood
County, 212 N. C. 284, 193 S. E. 668 (1937) ; Wilson v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 856,
175 S.E. 306 (1934) ; Starmount Co. v. Hamilton Lakes, 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E.
909 (1933) ; Glenn v. Commissioners, 201 N. C. 233, 159 S.E. 439 (1931) ; Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 S.E. 25 (1926) ; Storm v. Wrightsville
Beach, 189 N. C. 679, 128 S.E. 17 (1925) ; Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125,
128, 45 S.E. 1029, 1030 (1903) ("If the matter of lighting is a necessary expense,
then how and in what manner the city shall furnish such lighting is with the authorities of the city or town to determine.") ; Black v. Commissioners, 129 N. C.
121, 39 S.E. 818 (1901); Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C. 420 (1898); Mayo v.
Washington, 122 N. C. 5 (1898) ; Vaughrl v. Commissioneis, 117 N. C. 429, 434
(1895)

(". . . conceding as we do that the cost of erecting courthouses and jails

• . .is one of the necessary expenses of a county, we have no authority . . ".of

1952]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

315

as it would be impractical for the courts to enter into the administration
of local affairs by passing on the necessity of each individual appro7
priation.
While recognizing that this rule has been an integral part of the law

of North Carolina since 1870, the court could not agree upon its application to the situation presented in Green v. Kitchen8 in 1948. The
problem arose in this way: The Town of Weldon paid the salary and
expenses of its police chief while he attended a 90-day course of special
training at the National Police Academy in Washington, D. C. This
expenditure had not been approved by the voters of the town. A taxpayer sued to have the payments returned on the ground, among others,
that they were not for a "necessary expense" within the meaning of Article VII, section 7, of the Constitution. The defendants (commissioners,
mayor, and police chief of Weldon) demurred ore tenus to the complaint
on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. The demurrer was
sustained and the action dismissed. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed, and it was held that special training of a policeman is a necessary
municipal expense.
There was no dissent from the decision on the merits of the case.9
determining what kind of a courthouse is needed or what would be a reasonable
limit to the cost."); McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C. 34 (1895) ; McKethan v. Commissioners, 92 N. C. 243 (1885) ; Evans v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 154 (1883) ;
Cromartie v. Commissioners, 87 N. C. 134 (1882) ; Satterthwaite v. Commissioners,
76 N. C. 153 (1877).
'In Mitchell v. Trustees, 71 N. C. 400, 401 (1874), the court stated that "[ilt
borders on the ridiculous to ask the Courts to say whether $34 for office rent, $20
for a book, $25 for a table, etc., etc., are necessary expenses." In Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748, 760 (1876): "No other rule could be adopted without inconvenience and injury. If no one could contract with a county for the building of a
bridge,'or with a city for the building of a market house, or other work coming
apparently within the class of necessaries, and which the government of the corporation has deemed necessary, except at the risk of having the contract avoided
by the decision of a court, which may take a view of the actual necessity different
from that of the city government; then no one would contract without either charging an extra proportionate to the risk, or insuring safety by gettin.q the opinion of
the court if possible. The public business would be sacrificed or seriously obstructed, and the courts would assume the duties of municipal government, for
which
they were not intended."
7
Except in cases of fraud, the courts cannot control the discretion of the local
authorities. Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903). In
Starmount Co. v. Hamilton Lakes, 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E. 909 (1933), it was
contended that there was no necessity for 81 miles of water main, 7Y2 miles of
sewer main, 22 miles of improved streets, and 3 miles of paved streets, costing
$200,000 in the aggregate, for the benefit of 4 or 5 families living in a municipal
corporation covering only 1400 acres. The court held that since waterworks, sewerage systems and streets come within the class of necessary expenses, it could
not control the discretion of the commissioners as to when they were needed.
8 229 N. C. 450, 50 S. E. 2d 545 (1948).
' Four issues were decided by the court in favor of sustaining the validity of the
expenditure. It was held that statutory authority could be implied from the express
power to appoint and employ police; that police training is a public purpose within
the meaning of Art. V §3 of the North Carolina Constitution; that police training
is a necessary expense within the meaning of Art. VII §7; and that the payment
did not violate Art. 1 §7, which forbids "separate emoluments or privileges from
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Three justices, however, writing two opinions, did not think that the,
"necessary expense" question was presented to the court for decision.,
Mr. Justice Stacy said that the only question was whether the complaint
stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Inasmuch as the
truth of the allegation that the payments "were not necessary expenses
of said Town" was admitted by demurrer, the complaint stated a cause
of action under Article VII, section 7, and "[t] he demurrer should have
been overruled, and the defendants put to answer." 10 He further stated
his position, in reliance upon the established rule as to the relative functions of the courts and commissioners: "Nowhere on the record now
before us (complaint and demurrer) does it appear that the Commissioners of Weldon have declared or determined that the instant expenditures are necessary for the governance of the municipality. On the other
hand, they have come into court and conceded on demurrer that the
expenditures are 'not necessary expenses of said Town.' When the body
first charged with responsibility in the matter says the expenditures are
not necessary, how can we say otherwise without usurping the powers
of the local authorities? It is only when the question is presented as
one of law, stripped of any question of fact, that the courts are authorized
to act in the premises .... The Commissioners of the Town ... are first

to determine as a matter of fact whether a given expenditure is 'for the
necessary expenses thereof' before the courts can be called upon to say
whether such expenditure falls within the category of necessary governmental expenses.""1 In this view, Justices Winborne and Denny concurred.
justice Ervin, writing the majority opinion, took a contrary view
which to the dissenting justices disrupted a long line of decisions and
left the law in confusion. He pointed out that "[i]n reaching this decision, we have not overlooked the allegations of the complaint that the
expenditures involved 'were not necessary expenses of said Town.' . ."
But "[t]hese allegations are not averments of fact. They are mere
conclusions of law asserted by the pleader. Consequently, they are not
admitted by the demurrer."' 2 [Italics added.] He took cognizance of
the rule which reserves to the discretion of the local authorities the dethe community but in consideration of public service." See Coates, Green v.
Kitchen, 27 N. C. L. RZEv. 500 (1949). It is readily apparent that no one of the
three dissenting justices thought the expenditure was invalid. Justice Stacy simply
thought that "we do not reach the question discussed in the majority opinion."
See Green v. Kitchen, 229 N. C. 450, 460, 50 S. E. 545, 552 (1948) (dissenting
opinion). Justices Winborne and Denny stated that "if the question were properly
before us, we might not have any quarrel with the majority view that the expenses
incurred in question here, might fall within that class of expenditures that come
within the definition of "necessary expenses." . . . Id. at 462, 50 S. E. 545, 553
(1948)
(dissenting opinion).
10
Id.at 461, 50 S.E. 2d 545, 553 (1948).
- Id. at 460, 50 S.E. 2d 545, 552 (1948).
12 Id. at 457, 50 S.E. 2d 545, 550 (1948).
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cision on the need of a given project in a designated locality, but did
not think that his conclusion was in conflict.
The majority opinion did not clarify this position, but it is believed
that it can be sustained under the previously existing law,13 and that the
quandary of having two opposing contentions stem from the application
of the one proposition can be resolved. The demurrer to the allegation
that the expenditure was not for a necessary expense of Weldon did not
constitute a factual determination of non-necessity by the commissioners,
because a valid action on behalf of the town could only have been taken
by them in a lawfully held and constituted meeting.' 4 The official determination that the expenditure was in fact necessary was made, in
effect, by adoption of the resolution which authorized the policeman to
take a leave of absence with pay and which appropriated a sum of,
money to cover his expenses.' 5 This prior determination of factual
necessity by the commissioners presented the "necessary expense" question to the court as a matter of law,' 6 and it properly decided the case
See note 5 supra.
"The exercise of the power to decide whether a particular expenditure is necessary for a designated locality otherwise than by a majority vote of the commissioners assembled in a lawful meeting is not a determination by the "Board of
Commissioners."
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§160-1 (1943) (" . . every incorporated city or town is a
body politic and corporate.. . .") ; 160-3 ("The corporate powers can be exercised
only by the board of commissioners, or in pursuance of resolutions adopted by
them, unless otherwise specially provided by law.") ; 160-269 (".. . every matter
shall be put to a vote .... The governing body shall not by executive session or
otherwise consider or vote on any question in private session.") ; 153-1 ("Every
county is a body politic and corporate . . . and its powers can only be exercised
by the board of commissioners, or in pursuance of a resolution adopted by them.").
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Guilford County, 225 N. C. 293, 302, 34
S. E. 2d 430, 435 (1945) (". . it is sufficient to point to the lack of any corporate
finding that the proposed undertaking . . .was necessary or needed in the city
of High Point for county governmental expenses. This is fundamental to the
undertaking. And the fact that 'in the judgment of the several members' of th6
board of commissioners such a public building was necessary is not a corporate
action, and determinative of the fact.") ; O'Neal v. Wake County, 196 N. C. 184,
187, 145 S.E. 28, 29 (1928) (".. . to make a contract which shall be binding upon
the county the board must act as a body convened in legal session, regular, adjourned, or special. A contract made by members composing the board when acting in their individual and not in their corporate capacity while assembled in a
lawful meeting is not the contract of the county. As a rule authorized meetings
are prerequisite to corporate action based upon deliberate conference and intelligent
discussion of proposed measures. . . . The principal applies to corporations
generally, and by the express terms of our statute . ..[N. C. GEaI. STAT. §153-1
(1943) ] every county is a corporate body.") By the provisions of N. C. GEN. STAT.
§160-1 (1943), every incorporated city or town is also a corporate body. See also
London v. Commissioners, 193 N. C. 100, 136 S.E. 356 (1927) ; Cleveland Cotton
Mills v. Commissioners, 108 N. C. 678, 13 S.E. 271 (1891) (by implication).
" "... it seems to us that the action of the town council in expressly authorizing and directing the expenditure to be made ought to be deemed tantamount to
a determination on its part that it was necessary or needed for the proper enforcement of law and order within the municipality." Green v. Kitchen, 229 N. C. 450,
458, 50 S.E. 2d 545, 551 (1948).
"aThe term "necessary expenses" includes law and fact. The courts decide the
one and the local authorities the other. Glenn v. Commissioners, 201 N. C. 233,
159 S. E. 439 (1931); Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 S. E. 25
1

(1926).
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on its merits, without invading the discretion left by law to the local
authorities.' 7
This view is further borne out by pursuing to 'conclusion the course
of action advocated by the dissenting opinions. Suppose that the demurrer had been overruled and the defendants "put to answer." Logically, the truth of the allegation of the non-necessity of the expenditure
would have been denied, thereby raising an issue to be 'decided by the
jury, or by the judge if jury trial were waived. This would clearly have
constituted a substitution of the finding of the jury or judge for that
of the commissioners, contrary to the undisputed rule of law that it is
wifhin the discretion of the local governing authorities to determine
whether in fact an expense is necessary for a particular locality. Paradoxically, it is the very result which the dissenting justices wanted to
avoid.
What the court 'disagreed on was not whether the necessary expense question is one of law and fact or one exclusively of law, nor the
question of the relative functions of the courts and commissioners. Rather,
the trouble arose from the failure to distinguish between the question of
fact in the determination of "necessary expense," which is decided in the
discretion of the local governing authorities, and a question of fact as
used in its usual and technical sense, which is decided by the trier of
fact with reference to the evidence in the case. The effect of the argument of the dissenting opinions was to confuse the two meanings of the
one term, and while recognizing the rule which reserves to the commissioners the power to decide the necessity of a particular expenditure, cut
it short of its full significance by insisting, in effect, that the question be
submitted to a jury. It seems clear from this case that the factual determination of local necessity, as a prerequisite to the existence of the
necessary expense question as a matter of law, can only be made by the
local governing authorities acting in an official capacity, if the power
reserved to them by the force of a long line of decisions is not to be
usurped.
In order to reach the decision that the allegation of non-necessity
"'The majority stated without explanation that its conclusions did not "render
all authorized proceedings of the governing authorities of municipal corporations
subject to judicial control. The converse is true for the reason that courts will
not interfere with the exercise of discretionary powers conferred on municipal
corporations for the public welfare, unless their action is so clearly unreasonable as
to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion." Green v. Kitchen,
229 N. C. 450, 459, 50 S. E. 2d 545, 551 (1948). But the dissenting justices clearly
felt that the decision that special training of Weldon's police chief was a necessary
expense was an infringement of the commissioners' power. The argument was
advanced that ". .. if this court is going to decide both questions of law and fact
involved in what is "necessary expense" and when such expense is a necessary one
for a particular locality, then governing authorities of municipalities may find themselves confronted with a mandamusr to require them to send all their officers to a
police school at public expense, whether they think it proper to do so or not." Id.
at 462, 50 S. E. 2d 545, 553 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
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demurred to by the commissioners in Green v. Kitchen was a mere conclusion of law, and thus not admitted,' s it was necessary to find that the
commissioners had previously made a determination of local necessity.' 0
They had not expressly made such a finding, but the majority of the
court did not think that one was required. It treated the express authorization of the expenditure by the commissioners as tantamount to a
determination and declaration on their part that it was necessary for the
proper enforcement of law and order within the municipality. 20 On the
other hand, the dissenting opinions were clearly based upon the belief
that no finding of necessity had been made by the local authorities. 2 1
The majority seems to represent the better view, but since no authority
was used to support this position, and since several prior cases 22 had
indicated that an express declaration of local necessity was essential
before the court could classify an expenditure as a necessary expense
as a matter of law, it may be appropriate to question the soundness of
the position 23 in order to determine how far it may be relied upon in the
future. 24 It is believed that in so far as prior cases require an express,
"sA demurrer admits for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the pleading,
the truth of factual averments and relevant inferences .to be deduced therefrom,
but not conclusions of law asserted by the pleader. E.g., General American Insurance Co. v. Stadium, 223 N. C. 49, 25 S. E. 2d 202 (1943); Cathay v. Southeastern Construction Co., 218 N. C. 525, 11 S. E. 2d 571 (1940); Leonard v. Maxwell,
Com'r, 216 N. C. 89, 3 S. E. 2d 316 (1939) ; Hussey v. Kidd, 209 N. C. 232, 183
S. E. 355 (1935).
"°The term "necessary expenses" is a mixed question of law and fact. See
note 16 supra and cases cited note 5 supra. Until the factual question of necessary
expense is determined, it seems that the question cannot exist as one exclusively of
law.
20 "The town made this expenditure to maintain law and order within its borders.
In so doing it was performing an inherent function of sovereignty delegated to it
by the State under statutes enacted by the Legislature in conformity to the Constitution. Since the Town of Weldon could not confer upon itself the constitutional
and statutory authority to make an expenditure for this purpose by any action of
its governing authorities, we are unwilling to adjudge that it acted illegally in this
particular case in exercising a discretionary power conferred upon it by the Constitution and legislative fiat merely because of some supposed insufficiency in the
phrasing of the resolution of its governing body directing the making of the expenditure. But even if it be assumed that the Town of Weldon could not exercise
a discretionary power conferred upon it by the Constitution and the Legislature in
the absence of some linguistic proclamation by its governing body that the expenditure in question was necessary or needed in the locality embraced by its limits, it
seems to us that the action of the town council in expressly authorizing and directing the expenditure to be made ought to be deemed tantamount to a determination
and declaration on its part that it was necessary or needed for the proper enforcement of law and order within the municipality." Green v. Kitchen, 229 N. C. 450,
458, 50 S.E. 2d 545, 550 (1948).
-1 See text p. 316.
"- See note 25 infra.
" An alternative approach is to consider whether the majority position changes
previously existing law, or whether there has heretofore been no actual decision
on the point.
" The court also stated that "...
we are unwilling to adjudge that it [Town of
Weldon]acted illegally in this particular case . .

.",

Green v. Kitchen, 229 N. C.

450, 458, 50 S. E. 2d 545, 550 (1948), but there is no reason to believe that this
was said with the intention of restricting the decision to the facts of the case.
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declaration of necessity, they are of questionable validity. 5 In addition,
5 Two cases follow the same line of reasoning found in the dissenting opinions
of Green v. Kitchen. In Wilson v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 856, 175 S. E. 306 (1934),
the resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds to erect a fire drill tower failed to
recite that the tower was a necessary expense for the city of Charlotte. The trial
judge found that in fact the tower was not necessary. On appeal, the order restraining the bond issue was affirmed, as no exception had been made to the finding.
Here the trial judge clearly exercised the fact finding function reserved to the local
authorities. Under the reasoning of the majority opinion in Green v.Kitchen, the
authorization of the bond issue would have been treated as tantamount to a finding
of local necessity, and the necessary expense question decided as one of law by the
court, which might well have led to a different result, since the only question considered by the court on appeal was whether the facts found were sufficient to support the judgment.
There was language in Black v. Commissioners, 129 N. C. 121, 39 S.E. 818
(1901), to the effect that where an allegation that expenditures were not made for
necessary expenses was denied, an issue of fact was raised which the judge was
not authorized to try, and that the court could not in this situation presume that
the commissioners acted properly. McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C. 34, 23 S.E. 99
(1895), where the court presumed that notes were given for necessary expenses of
the county, was distinguished on the ground that there it was not denied that the
indebtedness was based upon the necessary expenses of the county. But again, if
the rule giving local authorities the power to decide the necessity of a project in a
given locality is to be followed, the fact question in Black v. Commissioners was
decided before the litigation was begun, and the denial of the allegation of nonnecessity could not revive this question of fact for jury decision without usurping
the power reserved to the commissioners. At the trial stage the necessary expense
question seems exclusively one of law.
In Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1937), holding that an airport is not a necessary expense, the court "noted that the ordinancd appropriating
the $5,000 in question is not predicated upon any finding or determination of the
governing body that it is for a necessary expense." Id. at 65, 195 S.E. 271, 274
(1937). Since the decision was to the effect that an airport is not a necessary
expense as a class, this language has no significance on the question whether an
express finding of local necessity is a prerequisite to a decision that an expenditure
is a necessary expense as a matter of law. When the court determines the necessary expense question in the negative, it necessarily acts independently of any
declaration to the contrary by local authorities, in line with the relative functions
of the courts and commissioners, although practically, a finding that a tax is for a
necessary expense by the commissioners is persuasive on the court in its deciding
the question as a matter of law. Martin v. Raleigh, 208 N. C. 369, 180 S.E. 786
(1935). This is to be distinguished from an answer by the court in the affirmative,
which raises the problem of the principal case. Apparently, the observation in
Sing v. Charlotte was made merely to buttress an opinion which could have been
reached even if the commissioners had expressly stated by resolution that the airport was a necessary expense for Charlotte.
In Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Guilford County, 225 N. C. 293,
34 S. E. 2d 430 (1945), the court declared a provision in a deed by which the
county agreed to assume certain indebtedness to the plaintiff, unenforceable as an
express contract on the several grounds that it was violative of the necessary expense limitation of Art. VII, §7, and the debt limitation provision of Art. V, §4 of
the Constitution, and that the board of commissioners had not acted in its corporate
capacity, or in pursuance of the requirements of the County Finance Act. The
court stated: "Testing the present case by these constitutional limitations and
statutory provisions, and decisions of this Court interpretive thereof, it is sufficient
to point to the lack of any corporate finding that the proposed undertaking ...
was necessary or needed in the city of High Point for county governmental purposes. This is fundamental to the undertaking. And the fact that 'in the judgment
of the several members' of the board of commissioners such a public building was
necessary is not a corporate action, and determinative of the fact." Id. at 302, 34
S. E. 2d 430, 435 (1945). It is not entirely clear whether or not the authorization
for the incurrance of the indebtedness was considered by the court to have been
made by a lawfully adopted resolution of the board of commissioners. If the undertaking was not made by the board of commissioners acting in its corporate
capacity, then the contract is unenforceable against the town on this ground. Also,
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there is some slight authority to support the majority opinion.26 Morean appropriation invalidly made cannot suffice for a determination of local necessity. On the other hand if the authorization was validly made, and if the language
quoted above refers only to the omission of an expression in the resolution that
the building was a necessity for the locality, then the court may be demanding an
express declaration of local necessity as a prerequisite to a finding of necessity by
the court. However, this does not necessarily follow. Since the purpose of the
assumption of the debt (erection of county office building) had previously been
classified a necessary expense, e.g., Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N. C. 569, 65 S.E.
279 (1909), for the court here to decide that as a matter of law the expenditure
was not for a necessary expense would be differentiating between localities, which
practice the same court has since condemned in Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N. C. 1,
40 S. E. 2d 702 (1946). See note 3 supra. If the court was deciding that the
indebtedness was not in fact for a necessary expense for Guilford County, then
it invaded the power reserved to the local authorities.
There is language in one other case, which if not explained, might be misleading.
In Hall v. Commissioners of Duplin, 195 N. C. 367, 142 S.E. 315 (1928), a taxpayer sought to enjoin the county board of commissioners from issuing bonds for
the purpose of erecting schoolhouses. The trial court upheld the validity of the
bond issue on the basis of its finding of fact that the proposed schoolhouses were
necessary for the maintenance of the six-month school term required by Art. IX, §2
of the Constitution, and that in providing them the county was acting as an administrative agent of the state. These facts are essential to the validity of bonds
issued for school purposes without the approval of the voters, Hall v. Commissioners of Duplin, 194 N. C. 768, 140 S.E. 739 (1927), as schools are not a necessary expense within the meaning of Art. VII, §7 of the Constitution. Bridges v.
Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472, 20 S.E. 2d 825 (1942) ; Greensboro v. Guilford County,
209 N. C. 655, 184 S.E. 473 (1936). The plaintiff in the Hall case contended that
inasmuch as the bond resolution was silent as to the necessity of the expenditures
for maintaining the constitutional school term, the court had no power to make this
finding, and that to allow such action would in effect permit the court to pass a
bond ordinance or to amend one already passed by the county commissioners. The
supreme court sustained this contention, and said that when bonds are issued for
the purpose of erecting or purchasing schoolhouses or lands for school purposes
without approval of the voters on the basis of their being necessary for the establishment or maintenance of the six month school term as required by Art. IX, §2,
this purpose mutst be set forth in the bond resolution itself. But it must be noted
that expenditures for school purposes have had a unique history. See Coates and
Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses," 18 N. C. L. REv. 93 at 109 (1940). They were
repeatedly refused admission into the circle of "necessary expenses," and were only
belatedly given a comparable status through the invocation of Art. IX of the
Constitution, to avoid the restriction of Art. VII, §7. Collie v. Commissioners, 145
N. C. 170, 59 S.E. 44 (1907). Therefore, an expenditure to do more than is
necessary to operate schools for the constitutional term is still subject to the mandate of Art. VII, §7, and must be approved by a vote of the people. A finding of
necessity in order to bring the expenditure within the provisions of Art. IX, §2
is not the same as a finding of "necessary expense" within the meaning of Art. VII,
§7; therefore, the language in Hall v. Commissioners is not applicable to the question of whether an express declaration of local necessity should be made by the
local authorities.
It is probable that in none of the cases here discussed was the court actually
thinking of whether or not to require an expression of necessity by resolution
adopted by the board of commissioners.
"6In McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C. 34, 23 S.E. 99 (1895), defendant resisted
payment of bonds on the ground that the complaint did not show that the county
orders for which the bonds were issued were given for the necessary expenses of
the county, or by sanction of a vote of the people, and were therefore void. In
reiecting this contention, the court stated that since the complaint alleged that the
orders were valid, this was sufficient, as a county order issued without a popular
vote, except for necessary expenses, would be invalid; that there was nothing to
show that the orders were not issued for necessary expenses except an averment in
the answer to that effect, based on the failure of the plaintiff to so allege and not as
a substantive fact; and that the presumption was that the commissioners acted
within the scope of their authority and issued the orders for necessary expenses.
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over, allowing the authorization of an expenditure to suffice for an
express determination that it is necessary can clearly be supported by
reason, for as a practical matter, few businessmen serving as members
of a city or county board of commissioners are likely to feel that a word
formula is required to express their opinions on the necessity of making
appropriations for particular purposes. Assuming that a commissioner
will not reject and forget his usual and customary methods of doing
business when he steps from private life to public office, it is perhaps
more accurate to say that it may be presumed from the fact that an
expenditure was authorized, that the purpose was considered a necessary
expense by the commissioners, than to say that it may be presumed that
they did not think it necessary because 'they did not say that it was.
The unnatural requirement that a certain phrase be used to indicate
that a determination of local necessity has been made would impose an
undue penalty upon the local authorities, as it would serve in many
instances to shift the factual question of necessary expense from the commissioners to the courts. The absence of a requirement that the finding
of local necessity be expressly stated 'does not open the doors to fraudulent or excessive expenditures of public funds, for the abuse of discretion
27
by local authorities is always 'subject to review by the courts.

The soundness of the holding in Green v. Kitchen seems beyond dispute, but until its significance has been determined through its application to other situations, it may be advisable for local authorities to embody in each appropriation resolution, or stipulate by separate resolution (unless popular approval is secured), that it has been determined
that the expenditure is a necessary expense for that county or municipality.28 This is clearly 'decisive of the factual question of necessary
expense and leaves only the question of law to be decided by the courts.
STEPHEN P. MILLIKIN.
It seems that the commissioners could as well be deemed to have determined that
an expenditure was necessary when it was made by valid resolution, but omitted
an expression of necessity.
In Tate v. Greensboro, 114 N. C. 392, 19 S.E. 767 (1894), an analogous case in
another field, the court assumed throughout that the city acted in the public interest,
although there was no declaration by the city to that effect. A street committee
appointed by the board of commissioners decided to have certain trees removed
from land located in front of plaintiff's home which had been dedicated for street
purposes. In an action for damages for lessening the comfort of the home by removing the trees when not necessary for public convenience, the court refused to
review the exercise of discretion in the matter by the city in the absence of an
allegation of want of good faith, on the ground that to allow a jury to judge of
the correctness of the conclusion reached by the street committee would be transferring
to court and jury the discretion which the law vests in municipalities.
"7E.g.. Riddle v. Ledbetter, 216 N. C. 491, 5 S. E. 2d 542 (1939) ; Hudson v.
City of Greensboro, 185 N. C. 502, 117 S. E. 629 (1923); State v. Staples, 157
N. C 637, 73 S. E. 112 (1911) ; Southern Ry. v. Commissioners, 148 N. C. 220, 61
S. E. 690 (1908).
"sAs a matter of practice, resolutions authorizing bond issues do expressly state
that the commissioners have determined that the purpose for which the proceeds
will be used is a necessary expense, for this is presently required by bond attorneys
doing business in North Carolina.

